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Abstract:
The European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) compliance is becom-
ing a legal necessity for software systems that process and manage personal data. As
a result of that fact, GDPR compliance and privacy components need to be considered
from the early stages of the development process and software engineers should analyze
not only the system but also its environment. Hereby with this study, Privacy Enhanced
Secure Tropos (PESTOS) is emerging as a privacy modeling language based on Tropos
methodology, which covers the goal and rule perspective, for helping software engineers
by assessing candidate PETs, while designing privacy-aware systems, in order to make
them compatible with GDPR. Although in Article 5(2) of the GDPR, the accountability
principle requires organizations to show compliance with the principles of the GDPR,
(To the best of our knowledge, currently there is no other privacy modeling language
especially focuses on the GDPR compliance and enhanced based on Security Risk-Aware
Secure Tropos methodology) there were not any practical social modeling languages
supply the demand driven by industrial and commercial needs. This is a serious issue
for public institutions and private sector in EU-zone because GDPR brings very serious
charges for data controllers and data processors, therefore organizations do not feel
themselves ready to face with those regulations and software engineers have a lack of
methods for capturing change requests of the information systems. This paper applies a
structured privacy modeling language that is called as PESTOS which has a goal-oriented
solution domain that aims to bring a high compatibility with GDPR by covering Privacy
by Design strategies for assessing proper privacy-enhancing technologies(PETs) in a
respect of the goal-actor-rule perspective. Among 99 articles of GDPR, 21 articles can be
identified as technical level of requirements that PESTOS is able to transform them into
GDPR goals needs to be fulfilled in order to support business assets. A survey conducted
by identity & security experts validates that proposed model has a sufficient level of
correctness, completeness, productivity and ease of use.
Keywords: Privacy, Data Protection, Privacy by Design, Regulation, GDPR, PETs,
Privacy-enhancing Technologies, Tropos, Secure Tropos, Compliance, GDPR Compli-
ance, Requirement Analysis, Privacy Modeling, European Union
CERCS: T120 - Systems engineering, computer technology
Privacy Enhanced Secure Tropos: Modelleerimiskeel Euroopa Liidu
isikuandmete kaitse üldmääruse (GDPR) vastavuse jaoks
Lühikokkuvõte:
Euroopa Liidu isikuandmete kaitse üldmäärusele (GDPR) vastavuse tagamine saab õigus-
likult hädavajalikuks kõigis tarkvarasüsteemides, mis töötlevad ja haldavad isikuandmeid.
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Sellest tulenevalt tuleb GDPR-i vastavuse ja privaatsuse komponentidega arvestada aren-
dusprotsessi varajastes etappides ning tarkvara insenerid peaksid analüüsima mitte ainult
süsteemi, vaid ka selle keskkonda. Käesolev uuring keskendub viimasel ajal tähepepanu
pälvinud modelleerimiskeelele Privacy Enhanced Secure Tropos (PESTOS), mis põhineb
Tropos metoodikal hõlmates eesmärkide ja reeglite vaatenurka, mis aitab tarkvarainsene-
ridel hinnata erinevaid Privacy-enhancing Technologies (PET-e) kandidaate, arendades
samas privaatsustundlikke süsteeme, et need oleksid GDPR-iga kooskõlas. Kuigi GDPR
artikli 5 lõikes 2 sätestatakse, et vastutuse põhimõtte kohaselt peavad organisatsioonid
suutma näidata vastavust GDPR põhimõtetele (meie teadmiste kohaselt ei ole praegu veel
ühtegi teist privaatsuse modelleerimise keelt, mis keskendub eelkõige GDPR nõuetele ja
mis põhineb Security Risk-Aware Secure Tropos metoodikal) ei olnud saadaval ühtegi
praktilist sotsiaalset modelleerimise keelt, mis rahuldaks tööstus- ja ärivajadusi. See
on Euroopa Liidu piirkonna avalikele asutustele ja erasektorile tõsine probleem, kuna
GDPR toob vastutavatele töötlejatele ja volitatud töötlejatele kaasa väga tõsiseid trahve.
Organisatsioonid ei oma piisavat kindlustunnet regulatsioonide täitmise osas ja tarkvara
inseneridel puuduvad meetodid saamaks ülevaadet infosüsteemide muutmistaotlustest.
Käesolevas lõputöös rakendatakse struktureeritud privaatsuse modelleerimise keelt, mida
kutsutakse PESTOS-iks. Selle eesmärk on tagada kõrgetasemeline vastavus GDPR-i
nõuetele kattes PET-e eesmärk-tegija-reegel perspektiivis hindamiseks ka lõimitud and-
mekaitse põhimõtted. 99-st GDPR artiklist 21 artiklit saab identifitseerida tehniliste
nõudmistena, mile osas PESTOS suudab ettvõttetel aidata GDPR-ist tulenevaid kohus-
tusi täita. Identiteedi- ja turvaekspertide seas läbiviidud uuring kinnitab, et kavandatud
mudelil on piisav õigsus, täielikkus, tootlikkus ja kasutusmugavus.
Võtmesõnad: privaatsus, andmekaitse, privaatsuslõime, määrus, isikuandmete kaitse
üldmäärus, PETs, Privacy-enhancing Technologies, Tropos, Secure Tropos, vastavus,
vastavus isikuandmete kaitse üldmäärusega, nõuete analüüs, privaatsus modelleerimine,
Euroopa Liit
CERCS: T120 - Süsteemitehnoloogia, arvutitehnoloogia
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1 Introduction
Privacy fills our lives and thoughts. It showed up first as a social need and, later, also
as an essential human right, protected in international laws. Finally, by emergence of
Internet era and development of computerization, privacy in cyberspace becomes a key
issue for our society. Numerous information technologies affect and change the way
of communication, education, business, government, healthcare and many other public
services. Additionally, Internet provides a medium for those technologies, as well as it
creates a networked, globalized society connected by them. On the other hand, this huge
social progress for the society is accompanied by a lot of privacy and security concerns
such as data breach, identity theft, surveillance in terms of interception of electronically
transmitted information, video surveillance, cyber fraud, and so on.
Since software systems handle more and more sensitive information about users,
another key thing to remember is there are social concerns fed by privacy and security
issues mentioned previously. As ex-MP of Finland, Esko Seppänen, once said during a
debate on information society in European Parliament: "The information society is the
chaos society" [EuP]. Indeed, the fact is that he has a point that every member of our
generation, potentially can be targeted by cyber attackers, monitored by authorities, and
subjected to incorporeal suffering because of loss of privacy. Regarding the so-called
"chaos society", it is natural to mention about a discrepancy called "privacy paradox". A
research made by Susan Barnes shows that users of social network sites provide a large
amount of personal information on public profiles, meanwhile being worried about their
privacy [Bar06]. Thus, building privacy-sensitive technologies becomes gradually more
important and that is exactly where this thesis idea also comes from.
The 21st century has become the century of Big Data and highly advanced Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies (ICT) dealing with storing and processing
exabytes of data. But most of those advances in ICT threaten privacy increasingly,
and have reduced the level of control over personal data. As a result, possibility of a
range of adverse consequences as a result of access to personal data has been intensified
[SFEb]. Both private companies and public authorities make use of personal data on an
unprecedented scale in order to pursue their activities [GDP]. Additionally, members of
the society increasingly make personal information available publicly and globally.
Despite all, in the areas of legal practice, privacy comes into prominence as a principal
value, and GDPR appears as the most distinct example of that. GDPR brings rights for
users and aims to give them control on their personal information and enforce institutions
to minimize personally identifiable information on their datasets. However, GDPR
costs a lot for the industry. The impact of GDPR noncompliance will be massive for
organizations that employ information systems to support their critical business process,
as well as manage privacy-sensitive information. It is estimated that in the US, one in four
companies with more than 5,000 employees will spend over $1M on GDPR compliance
[Bab17].
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In spite of this, providers of software development tools and the research community
are still far-away from offering tools that enable the intuitive implementation of privacy
properties and facilitate interpretational difficulties of software engineers in eliciting of
privacy & security requirements from GDPR text. Additionally, privacy modeling is a
fresh concept, because for many years privacy was overlooked in IT by being considered
just a part of the security, rather than a relevant but different notion.
This master’s thesis work aims to propose a sustainable, valid and easy-to-use
modeling language, which is called Privacy Enhanced Secure Tropos (PESTOS). It
adopts a socio-technical approach based on Secure Tropos language for designing privacy-
sensitive software solutions to ensure GDPR compliance. Early stages of the system
development life cycle are crucial to the successful development, subsequent deployment,
and ongoing evolution of the software system, and thus PESTOS especially aims to
capture early privacy requirements for satisfying GDPR [Yu97]. Therefore, It is an honor
to emphasize that this dissertation brings novelty and practical approach into the privacy
modeling by paying regards to needs of society.
1.1 Research Questions
The main research question (MRQ) of the thesis :
MRQ - How to extend Tropos methodology for building the GDPR compliant software
systems?
MRQ can be disintegrated into some minor research questions(RQ).
RQ1 - How to make software systems GDPR-compliant?
RQ2 - How can Tropos methodology implement GDPR-compliance principles?
RQ3 - How to apply enhanced Tropos methodology to the GDPR compliance?
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1.2 Solution Domain of PESTOS
Figure 1. Solution Domain of PESTOS
Figure 1 represents the approach, used to find a solution for the main research
question. According to this figure, PESTOS aims to realize GDPR compliance, which
obligates system engineers to take into account PbD (Privacy by Design) strategies, while
software systems are being built. Those strategies are designed to support the assessment
of appropriate PETs (Privacy-Enhancing Technologies), which help to fulfill privacy
requirements of the system.
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2 Privacy & Privacy Components
In this chapter, many aspects of the notion of privacy are mooted. This chapter aims to
provide readers with the necessary background about privacy concepts and to answer
several sub-research questions of RQ1. Those questions can be listed as : SRQ1.1 - What
is privacy? SRQ1.2 - What are PbD strategies? SRQ1.3 - What are PETs?
2.1 Definition and Ontological Problems of Privacy
A well-defined privacy ontology, that embodies privacy related concept along with their
interrelations and a deeper appreciation of its status, would form a great step forward
in designing, developing and deploying privacy-sensitive systems by helping software
engineers in capturing a clear and robust set of privacy requirements upon them [GGM16]
[CW10].
Approaches to addressing privacy issues tend to assume privacy is well understood
[CW10], but nothing could be further from the truth. Privacy has serious ontological
problems as a concept and those problems became more apparent especially since the
information is being processed in digital form by information systems. Furthermore,
today there is no doubt of that, typical approach to the privacy-related problems from a
security perspective is not anymore working since security is more concerned with safety
than with privacy.
Whereas now privacy is re-framed as a many-faceted concept by researchers [HZNF15]
[Sol06], before privacy debate has co-evolved with the development of information tech-
nology, it was claimed and believed by the legal authorities that privacy could be defined
as a unitary concept which is widely cited as "the right to be free of unnecessary public
scrutiny or to be let alone" [GH09] [CW10].
According to Solove, "Privacy is a concept in disarray and nobody can articulate
what it means" [Sol06]. Heurix et al. claim that "Privacy is a notion known to virtually
everybody, yet it is surprisingly difficult to define" [HZNF15]. Furthermore, Gharib et al.
make a similar inference, as mentioned in their literature review "Privacy is an elusive
and vague concept". They also emphasize in the same paper that although several efforts
have been made to clarify this concept by linking it to more refined concepts such as
secrecy, control of personal information, person-hood, etc, still there is no consensus,
neither on the definition of privacy nor on the analyze methods of privacy [GGM16].
And finally, BeVier identifies the privacy as vague, evanescent and protean [BeV95].
Beyond all of those problems about the definition of privacy, there is also value of
privacy is brought up by Chen et al. in their article for proposing a new ontological
approach. Chen et al. announce that in order to understand the importance and the role
of privacy we should know to what extent is it of value to us. Here, they mention how
philosophers justify an object’s value as a compound property of intrinsic value and
extrinsic value (a.k.a instrumental value). The intrinsic value of something is said to
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be the value that that thing has “in itself” or “for its own sake” or “as such” or “in its
own right”, while extrinsic value is value that can be generated from intrinsic values.
Intrinsic value is absolute but can be contextual, whereas extrinsic one can be subjective
and contextual [CW10] [SFEa].
According to Chen et al., privacy has a connotation of "rights" and because of its
association to those rights which are allegedly essential to human dignity, they corroborate
that privacy has intrinsic values. In human society, individuals develop relationships with
dignity and mutual respect. The rights, which are associated with the privacy, aim to
prevent the lost of dignity. In that sense, [CW10] states consequently privacy has also
extrinsic values.
Justification of privacy is not that easy. Moor, whose alleges in his paper "Towards
a Theory of Privacy in the Information Age" that dignity differentiates into two types
as natural dignity and normative dignity. And he mentions about natural privacy and
normative privacy, accordingly. In this regard, he proposed a Core Value Framework
(CVF) to uncover common existences in all human cultures as a means to justify the
importance of privacy. He calls those set of values, which are shared and fundamental to
human evaluation, as core values. When he asks if privacy is a core value, he assumes the
concept of privacy has a distinctly cultural aspect that goes beyond the core values. Moor
accepts that some cultures may value privacy and some may not, like small tribes who
live in Amazon rainforest and have no contact with the outside world [CW10] [Moo97].
2.2 Privacy by Design (PbD)
Privacy by Design (PbD) connotes a development approach for building privacy-sensitive
systems and services. Those systems and services could be realized as specific technolo-
gies, business operations, physical architectures and networked infrastructure, and even
to entire information ecosystems and governance models. The term, PbD, is originally
introduced by Cavoukian [Cav11], almost three decades ago and since that time, it is an
ever-evolving concept. In fact, PbD does not merely rely on technical solutions but it
also involves organisational procedures and business models which implement privacy
and data protection principles in order to render them an organization’s default mode
of operations. Thus, PbD can be understood as PETs plus privacy enhancing processes
[DDH+15] [RB11].
2.2.1 Privacy by Design Principles
Cavoukian claims that, PbD introduces a proactive approach to avoid data breaches and
their accompanying harm rather than simply offering mechanism for redness [Cav11].
It is based on practicing 7 principles which are highly inspired by the principles of the
Fair Information Practices(FIPs) but aiming also to extend beyond of them and to be
operationalized by organizations. Those are respectively: 1) Proactive not Reactive,
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Preventative not Remedial 2) Privacy as the Default Setting 3) Privacy Embedded into
Design 4) Full Functionality (Positive Sum not Zero-Sum) 5) End-to-End Security (Full
Life-cycle Protection) 6) Visibility and Transparency 7) Respect for User Privacy (Keep
it User-Centric). These seven foundational principles are characterizing properties rather
than instructions for specific measures to be taken [DDH+15] [Cav11]. For detailed
explanation about those principles please refer to Appendix III.
Leading agencies and regulators such as the OECD (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development), UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) and
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recognized the importance
of PbD. Moreover, in October 2010, 32nd International Conference of Data Protection
and Privacy Commissioners (ICDPPC) unanimously accepted to concept of PbD as an
essential component of fundamental privacy protection and encouraging its widespread
adoption. Finally, we would like to mention that PbD takes an important role within
the scope of new GDPR, Article 25 obliges to implement appropriate technical and
organizational measures by considering the concept of data protection by design [Cav11]
[RB11] [KW14].
On the other hand, PbD has also been subject to criticism. Davies assumes that
PbD is more a mutual consent concerning the challenges of data protection rather than
presenting the targeted solutions. He argues that PbD offers a significant overlap between
two domains, which are, the regulative and the engineering. And he notes that the
principles of PbD could be motivating, however, they are offering too less technical
substances and not enough connection points for economical interests. Rubinstein et al.
state that PbD have not yet widely adopted by private sector, but a few firms, and no one
among them has conducted before and after studies to determine if they achieved better
privacy results. Also, currently, it wouldn’t be a wrong accusation if someone said that
we lack of tools to realize privacy by design and there are limitations of the approach that
induced by its state-of-the-art beside inherent constraints [DDH+15] [Cav11] [RB11]
[KW14].
2.2.2 Privacy by Design Strategies
Hoepman [Hoe14] defines eight different privacy design strategies in order to support
privacy by design throughout the full software development life cycle. Hereby, this paper
is going to call them as Privacy by Design Strategies. Hoepman lists those strategies as
minimize, hide, separate, aggregate, inform, control, enforce and demonstrate based on
both the legal and the technical perspective on privacy protection. In the paper of ENISA
[DDH+15], minimize, hide, separate, aggregate are categorized under "data oriented
strategies" while the rest are considered as "process oriented strategies".
Hoepman outlines a design strategy as a fundamental approach to achieve a certain
design goal, that has certain properties that allow it to be distinguished from other
approaches which, achieve the same goal [Hoe14]. In a similar manner, he describes a
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privacy design strategy as a design strategy that achieves some level of privacy protection
as its goal [Hoe14].
Many design patterns are very specific, and therefore cannot be applied directly in the
concept development phase [DDH+15]. Hoepman proposes to use privacy strategies to
express higher level abstractions than privacy patterns. Thus, a privacy design pattern may
sometimes implement several PbD strategies for instance Attribute Based Credentials
which is a design pattern brings out minimize and hide as design strategies [Hoe14] [oIb].
Minimize: Minimize is counted as the most basic PbD strategy that represents data
minimization which expresses that the amount of personal data that is processed should
be as minimal as possible. By ensuring that no, or no unnecessary, data is collected, the
possible privacy impact of a system is limited. Employing that kind of strategy means
one has to answer whether the processing of personal data is proportional (with respect to
the purpose) and whether no other, less invasive, way exist to achieve the same purpose
[DDH+15].
Common design patterns that implements this strategy are "select before you collect",
"anonymisation" and "use pseudonyms" [DDH+15].
Hide: The second PbD strategy is hide, states that any personal data, and their
interrelationships, should be hidden from plain view, so it cannot be abused easily by an
adversary. The strategy does not dictates from whom the data should be hidden but the
intent is to hide the information from any untrusted party [Hoe14] [DDH+15].
Common design patterns are the use of encryption (locally, or on the network using
SSL), the use of mix networks to hide traffic patterns, or techniques to unlink certain
related events (e.g., anonymous cash or attribute based credentials). In essence, the hide
strategy aims to achieve unlinkability and even unobservability [Hoe14].
Separate: The third PbD strategy is seperate, reflects data or process separation.
The strategy states that: "The processing of personal information should be done in a
distributed fashion whenever possible". By decentralizing the processing or storage of
various personal information sources that belong to the same data subject, whole profile
of one person cannot be seized. In particular, data from separate sources should be stored
in separate databases, and these databases should not be linked. Data should be processed
locally whenever possible, and stored locally if feasible as well. Database tables should
be split when possible. Rows in these tables should be hard to link to each other, for
example by removing any identifiers, or using table specific pseudonyms [DDH+15]
[Hoe14].
Abstract: The forth PbD strategy is abstract (former it was called as aggregate
[Hoe14]), states that: details should be limited as much as possible by summarizing or
grouping any storage, collection or operation on personal data, within the constraints of
the agreed upon purposes [CHH16].
Aggregation of information over groups of attributes or groups of individuals, restricts
the amount of detail in the personal data that remains. This data therefore becomes less
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sensitive if the information is sufficiently coarse grained, and the size of the group over
which it is aggregated is sufficiently large. Here coarse grained data means that the data
items are general enough that the information stored is valid for many individuals hence
little information can be matched with a single person, thus protecting privacy of data
subjects [DDH+15].
Common design patterns are aggregation over time (for example used to provide
some level of privacy protection in smart metering and smart grid systems), dynamic
location granularity (used in location based services where the accuracy of the reported
location of a user is adapted dynamically to ensure that a reasonable number of other
users are at the same location) and Sweeney’s k-anonymity concept [Hoe14].
Inform: The fifth PbD strategy is inform and it underlines a notification event
which also obliged by GDPR (please refer section 3.2, Data Controller) for the sake
of transparency. Therefore, data subjects should be adequately informed about which
information is processed, for what purpose, and by which means whenever personal
information is processed. This also includes information about the measures that are
applied in order to protect personal data in the system. Moreover, data subjects should
be informed about third parties with which information is shared [Hoe14].
Data breach notifications and Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) are possible
design patterns for this PbD strategy [Hoe14].
Control: This PbD strategy states that data subjects should be capable to hold the
control over the processing of their personal information. In that sense, GDPR brings
Data Subject Rights to enable the data subjects to view, update and even ask the deletion
of personal data collected about their-selves. Design patterns who implement this strategy
are supposed to give users the tools to exert their data protection rights (Data Subjects
Rights in the GDPR context) [Hoe14].
Enforce: The seventh PbD strategy is enforce, states that: a privacy policy compatible
with legal requirements should be in place and should be enforced [Hoe14]. The strategy
ensures that the system is compatible with data protection legislation (in our case GDPR),
both at the time when the system is developed, as well as when the system is in operation.
Demonstrate: The final PbD strategy is demonstrate, that represent to be able to
demonstrate compliance with the privacy policy and any applicable legal requirements
[Hoe14]. According to GDPR context, this responsibility belongs to data controller and
data processor (in case of any).
2.3 Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs)
Starting in the 70s, the research community and especially Chaum explored the field of
privacy technologies. In 1995, the idea of structuring technology according to privacy
principles was discussed among Privacy and Data Protection Commissioners. At the time
the main principles were data minimization and identity protection by anonymization
and pseudonymization. Finally, this discussion lead to the term Privacy Enhancing
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Technologies (PETs) [DDH+15]. Initially, most of these technologies were designed by
the individuals for the individual end-user, rather than incorporated into an institutional
setting and they were proposing a technological fix for a technological problem which
is called electronic communication surveillance [SJBK03].Among the earliest PETs
were cryptographic systems that protected communications between individuals from
undesired eavesdropping [Phi04].
PETs are technical mechanisms, which eliminate or reduce personal data thereby
prevent unnecessary or unwanted processing of personal data, without loss of the func-
tionality of the information system and enable individuals to take control over their
personal data [GCW18]. They aim to preserve the privacy of individuals or groups and
help achieve compliance with legal frameworks such as data protection legislation and
data protection regulation. In this thesis, PESTOS use PbD design strategies in order
to elaborate the information system by assessing appropriate PET/PETs while consid-
ering its compliance with GDPR, by doing that PESTOS makes law and technology
complement each other and form an alliance to protect personal rights by steering the
best practices in respect of privacy by design concept.
Nowadays, we do not talk only about one type of privacy violation but many different.
On the other hand, there are thousands of PETs existing, most of which are available
online. A list of PETs at Stanfords’ CyberWiki [Pet11] shows the free technologies
aimed at empowering Internet users to gain better control over their data. Today, an IT
product is made of pre-existing building blocks and technology. Thus, to select the right
PET block as a privacy solution from the list for a given purpose and to utilize it in the
most effective way is undeniably important. In order to achieve that, we believe, first,
privacy threats must be well identified for each concerning process, that software deals
with. Secondly, as ENISA report suggests, we should take account of implementation,
applicability, quality and maturity of the anticipated PET [fNE16].
Thus, classification of PETs emerges as a topic at issue. Pullonen et al. propose a
classification (classification table can be found in Appendix V) which group PETs ac-
cording to their application goals and the controls which they aim to bringwith examples
of technologies [PMB17]. As Matulevicˇius et al. mentioned, the same PET should fall
into more than one category sometimes, for example encryption can be used for data
protection and also for secure communication [PMB17].
Shen and Pearson [SP11] offer another categorization for PETs such linking them
to Solove’s [Sol06] privacy taxonomy. Solove’s taxonomy categorize privacy crimes
under four harmful activities such as: information collection, information processing,
information dissemination and invasion. Solove’s taxonomy endeavors to guide the law
toward a more coherent understanding of privacy and it emerges as a widely-accepted
framework in the field of privacy law, already.
GDPR, in Article 25, it is written that "the controller shall, both at the time of
the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the processing itself,
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implement appropriate technical and organizational measures, such as pseudonymization,
which are designed to implement data-protection principles, such as data minimization,
in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in
order to meet the requirements of this Regulation" [GDP], in that way GDPR promotes
privacy by design principles and PETs which play a major role in implementing such
Privacy by Design approaches into real-world systems [fNE16].
However, except a numerous number of technologies, PETs have not become a
standard and widely used component in system design [DDH+15]. According to Borking
[Bor11], the main reason that lying behind of that fact is existence of obstacles in adopting
PETs. Borking mentions three different obstacles; first one is lack of availability of PETs
and lack of user friendliness and the second is lack of support by current regulations,
finally the last one is subsistence of drawbacks in infrastructure deployment.
Table 2 in Appendix VI provides a list of PETs that each one shows which kind
of PbD strategies it could be associated with and also which category it can fall into
according to its characteristic privacy solution. Those strategies represent the ways to
achieve a certain level of privacy protection within PbD and PETs are the technologies
which turn PbD strategies into the reality by implementing them to the system. In this
dissertation, classification of the PETs is predicated upon Table 2.
2.4 Summary
The purpose of that chapter was to find answer for those sub-research questions:
SRQ1.1 What is privacy? : Privacy is a many-faceted concept and has no one-size-
fits-all definition, however it is a value which is associated with rights that are allegedly
essential to human decency. It is a right of an individual to keep their personal matters
and relationships secret, for the sake of dignity and information security.
SRQ1.2 What are PbD strategies? : Those are eight different design strategies in
order to support Privacy by Design (PbD), a development approach for building privacy-
sensitive systems and services, throughout the full software development life cycle.
SRQ1.3 What are PETs? : PETs are technical solutions, which could eliminate, segre-
gate or minimize identifying particulars thereby prevent unnecessary or unauthorized
processing of personal data, without loss of the functionality of the information system
and enable individuals to take control over their personal data.
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3 The General Data Protection Regulation
In this chapter, GDPR and GDPR-related concepts are covered. This chapter aims to
provide readers with the necessary background about EU data protection regime and to
answer several sub-research questions of RQ1. Those questions are : SRQ1.4 - What is
GDPR? SRQ1.5 - What are GDPR actors? SRQ1.6 - How PETs and PbD strategies can
guarantee GDPR compliance?
3.1 Definition and Motivation
General data protection regulation (GDPR) is a data protection regime that brought into
force by European Union. According to EU, it is the most important change in data
privacy regulations in 20 years [EuG17]. Since May 25th, 2018 the GDPR came into
effect as directly applicable in all Member States, that means it does not need to be
transposed into any national law in contrast to the Directive 95/46/EC a.k.a Data Protec-
tion Directive which is the unsuccessful predecessor of the GDPR in a way [VB17] [Wik].
GDPR aims :
1. to give control back to citizens and residents over their personal data [Wik]
2. to prohibit the personal data citizens provide (being) used for a purpose other
than that for which it was collected.
3. to simplify the regulatory environment for international business by unifying
the regulation within the EU. (Because GDPR is directly applicable in all Member
States) [Wik]
4. to bring legal certainty and remove potential obstacles to the free flow of
personal data. (by equalizing the law within the EU) [VB17]
New data regulation brings better incentives for compliance with the regulatory
privacy and data protection framework as well as serious sanctions and fines for non-
compliant organizations. Thus, PESTOS aims to help system designers and developers
in order to plan, implement, maintain and demonstrate GDPR compliance(also known as
GDPR accountability) and finally it aims to protect also business sectors from impending
serious charges.
Main objectives of this modeling language: to ensure compliant processing of per-
sonal data by pointing proper PETs as technical measures should be assigned and build a
privacy-sensitive system which is capable according to PbD strategies. Nevertheless, the
GDPR does not limit the scope of appropriate measures as it states by Article 32 [GDP].
GDPR applies to any kind of processing of personal data which means any operation
or set of operations whether manual or automated that is performed on personal data
[VB17].
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3.2 GDPR Actors
In GDPR [GDP], we encounter with five different main actors which each of them
represents either a natural person or a legal person according to social modeling concept.
Section 4.1.1 presents the concept of actors , for more detailed information please refer
to that section. The main actors are supervisory authority, data subject, data controller
(or simply controller), data processor (or simply processor) and data protection officer,
respectively. A UML class diagram just on below displays GDPR actor generalization.
Figure 2. GDPR Actor Generalization
Supervisory Authority: Article 51 of the GDPR outlines the Supervisory Author-
ities. According to the Article 51 : "Supervisory Authority should be an independent
authority that is responsible for monitoring the application of the GDPR, in order to
protect the privacy rights of natural persons within the union" [GDP]. Also, we believe it
is useful to mention here that supervisory authorities are able to perform their duties or
carry out regulatory tasks on behalf of an authority in another EU State, according to
Article 6 of GDPR recitals [GDP].
Each Member State shall provide for one or more Supervisory Authorities in order
to perform the tasks which set out in Article 57 of the GDPR [GDP]. The tasks listed
below:
• Enforcing the GDPR;
• Monitoring the GDPR compliance
• Promoting privacy awareness
• Giving advice to data controllers about their obligations
• Giving advice to data processors about their obligations, in case of any data
processors exist;
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• Dealing with complaints;
• Conducting investigations;
• Conducting audits;
• Monitoring the impact of technologies on data protection;
• Monitoring the impact of commercial practices on data protection;
• Adopting standard contractual clauses
• Approving binding corporate rules (BCR);
• Maintaining a list in relation to the requirement for privacy impact analyses (PIA);
• Encouraging codes of conduct.
• Encouraging certifications and seals.
Data Subject: GDPR defines the data subject in Article 4 as an identifiable natural
person, that can be identified by references such as a name, an identification number,
location data and so on [GDP]. By GDPR, Individuals have rights against data processing
entities, those rights can be listed as [VB17]:
• to request for information that relating to them.
• to obtain confirmation from the controller as to whether or not their personal data
is being processed. (Right to Access)
• to lodge a complaint with the Supervisory Authority. (pursuant to Article 77)
• to require to be clearly informed by the existence of their rights.
• to obtain and, importantly, reuse their personal data.
• to object to the data processing for specified purposes. (Right to Object)
• to obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate
personal data concerning them. (Right to Rectification)
• to have incomplete personal data completed.(Right to Rectification)
• to have their data erased upon a request. (Right to Erasure)
• to transmit their personal data from one controller to another. (Right to Data
Portability)
• to receive compensation from the controller or processor(in case any) for the
damage they have suffered due to infringement of the GDPR. (Right to Claim
Compensation)
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Data Controller: Article 4 of the GDPR [GDP] describes the data controller as the
natural or legal person, that determines the purposes and means of the processing of
personal data, according the union law. Controller can commit his/her duty alone or
jointly with other controllers.
Responsibilities of the controller have been stated in Article 24 of the GDPR.
• The controller should take into account the scope and purposes of processing
• The controller shall inform the data subject upon a request
• The controller should take into account the risks.
• The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organizational measures
to ensure that processing is performed in accordance with this Regulation.
• The controller shall review those measures.
• The controller should update the measures if the Supervisory Authority thinks
updating is necessary.
• The controller shall notify the Supervisory Authority within 72 hours after becom-
ing aware of the data breach.
• The controller should be able to demonstrate compliance with the GDPR.
• The controller shall cooperate with the Supervisory Authority upon the request.
Data Processor: Article 4 of the GDPR describes the data processor as a natural or legal
person, who processes personal data on behalf of the controller. The article also clarifies
what processing means, it connotes any operation which is performed on personal data
[GDP].
Article 28 of the GDPR remarks the responsibilities of the processor such as on
below:
• to process the personal data on behalf of the controller.
• to inform the controller of any intended changes on data processing.
• to inform the controller without undue delay after becoming aware of the data
breach.
• to cooperate with the Supervisory Authorities
Data Protection Officer (DPO): Article 37, 38 and 39 covers DPO-related matters in
the GDPR text [GDP]. According to the articles, the data protection officer is someone
who is responsible to involve in issues, which relate to the protection of personal data. In
this way, the DPO performs a group of tasks, which are sorted below. Finally, the DPO
should also report the highest management level of person, whom he is supported by in
fulfilling the tasks. That person is either data controller or data processor, in case there is
a third party responsible in processing of data.
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• to notify the data controller.
• to notify the data processor in case of any.
• to notify the employees who carry out processing of their compliance obligations.
• to advise the data controller.
• to advise the data processor in case of any.
• to advise the employees who carry out processing of their compliance obligations.
• to monitor compliance with the GDPR
• to monitor compliance with data protection policies of non-EU countries if data
process to those countries.
• to audit processing of data through other member state data data protection provi-
sions.
• to audit processing of data with the policies of the controller.
• to audit processing of data with the policies of the processor in case of any.
• to audit assignment of responsibilities.
• to audit awareness-raising of staff involved in data processing operations.
• to provide advice where requested as regards the data protection impact assessment
(pursuant to Article 35).
• to monitor performance of data protection impact assessment (pursuant to Article
35).
• to cooperate with the supervisory authority.
• to act as the contact point for the supervisory authority on issues relating to data
processing.
3.3 GDPR Compliance Meta-model
In this meta-model, we display the GDPR actors and other GDPR concepts by mapping
them regarding associated rights and responsibilities to each actor in order to reach the
GDPR compliance.
In section 3.2, we have described the GDPR actors and have listed their rights and
responsibilities. Here we are going to introduce the rest of the concepts that take place in
the meta-model.
Personal Data: Personal data means any stored information, signs or indications
that make possible the identification of a person, directly or indirectly, based on it. For
example : social insurance number, location data, phone number, blood type, IP address
[VB17].
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The following categories of personal data are considered sensitive, as set out in Article
9 : racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade
union membership, data concerning health or sex life and sexual orientation, genetic
data, biometric data.
Data Processing: It means any kind of treatments of personal data such as [GDP]:
collecting, recording, organizing, structuring, storing, altering, restricting, erasing.
Data controller is responsible for lawfulness of those treatments. In Article 6, GDPR
states that personal data may be processed only if has at least one lawful basis. Lawful
basis could be [GDP]:
• a given consent by a data subject for a specific purpose of processing his/her
personal data.
• a legal justification by law for the processing activity
• necessary processing for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest.
• necessary processing for protecting the vital interests of the data subject.
Cross-border Processing: We can mention about cross-border processing if at least
one of those two situations emerges [GDP]:
• if a controller/processor is established in more than one Member State, so process-
ing of personal data takes in more than one place.
• if a controller/processor has data subjects in more than one Member State, thus
processing of personal data takes in more than one place.
Filing System: It is described in the Article 4, as any structured set of personal data
which are accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralized, decentralized or
dispersed on a functional or geographical basis [GDP].
Measure: Data protection measures could be technical or organizational. In this
study, we propose PETs and PbD patterns as technical measures should be applied to
personal data and information system designed to process personal data.
Consent: In Article 4 of the GDPR, consent is identified as any freely given, specific,
informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which it, by a
statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of its
personal data [VB17]. Consent must be clear and distinguishable from other matters and
provided in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. It
must be as easy to withdraw consent as it is to give it [GDP].
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Derogation: This legal term means an exemption from or relaxation of a rule or law.
Here, in that paper, whenever we refer that term a reader should understand an exemption
from some articles of GDPR under specific situations. For example, Article 66 of the
GDPR emphasizes that in a case of urgency if there is a need to act in order to protect the
rights and freedoms of data subjects, derogation could be take place based on an official
approval given by the Supervisory Authority [GDP].
Data Protection Impact Assessment: In GDPR, Article 35 is all about Data Pro-
tection Impact Assessment. It is a preventive study to identify appropriate measures for
mitigating the risks to data protection in case an intended processing activity, in particular
using new technologies, is considered to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms
of the data subjects. If the results of the assessment do not enable data protection officer
(or eventually controller) determine which safeguards could be applied, it will have to
consult with the Supervisory Authorities. The latter might issue black- and whitelists in
the future that clarify what processing activities will require a Data Protection Impact
Assessment [VB17].
Infringement: Infringement is any kind of acts that might break GDPR rules. Per-
sonal data breach, organizational ineffectiveness and lack of technical measures are
examples of infringements. According to Article 4 of the GDPR, personal data breach
means the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of,
or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed [GDP].
Binding Corporate Rules (BCR): Legally binding internal corporate privacy rules
for transferring personal information within a corporate group. BCR are typically used by
multinational corporations that operate in multiple jurisdictions, in order to compensate
for a lack of data protection in a third country that has not been declared as safe under
Article 45 of the GDPR. BCR must be approved by the EU data protection authorities of
the member states in which the corporation operates [VB17].
Complaint: According to GDPR,a complaint can be initiated by two different ways:
1.Data subjects can initiate complaints with courts of the appropriate Member State
and with the supervisory authority of the Member State where they reside, where
they work, or where the infringement occurred. This leaves open the possibility that
a controller or processor could face both judicial and administrative proceedings
for infringing the Regulation [GDP]. (Article 77/1)
2.A supervisory authority is competent to initiate its own complaints within its
Member State [GDP]. (Article 55/1)
Investigation: It means any investigations on the application of the GDPR, including
on the basis of information received from another Supervisory Authority or other public
authority. Investigations may be initialized based on a complaint, in that case Supervisory
Authority, who conducts the investigation, should inform the complainant of the progress
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and the outcome of the investigation within a reasonable period according to Article 57/f
[GDP].
According to GDPR compliance meta-model that we created: Zero or more (0..*) Su-
pervisory Authorities notifies zero or more data controllers/data processors for an alleged
infringement of the GDPR. Conversely zero or more data controllers/data processors
can be notified for an alleged infringement of the GDPR by zero or more Supervisory
Authorities. Zero or more Supervisory Authorities advices zero or more data controller-
s/data processors on legislative and administrative measures relating to the protection of
natural persons’ rights and freedoms. Reciprocally zero or more data controllers/data
processors can be advised by zero or more Supervisory Authorities on legislative and
administrative measures relating to the protection of natural persons’ rights and freedoms.
Moreover, zero or more Supervisory Authorities can issue warning or reprimand against
to zero or more data controllers/data processors due to infringements. Conversely zero or
more data controllers/data processors can be faced with warnings or reprimands from
zero or more Supervisory Authorities. Likewise, zero or more Supervisory Authorities
can impose administrative fines against to zero or more data controllers/data processors.
Reciprocally, zero or more data controllers/data processors can be charged by zero or
more Supervisory Authorities. Furthermore, a Supervisory Authority can approve or
reject zero or more Binding Corporate Rules. Conversely zero or more Binding Corporate
Rules should be approved or rejected by one or more Supervisory Authorities. One
or more Supervisory Authorities initiate and later also handle zero or more complaints
(some complaints may lodged by data subject, some other may be initiated as Supervisory
Authorities’ initiatives) which lead to investigations made by Supervisory Authorities
eventually. One or more investigations may detect zero or more personal data breaches
or/and infringements which expose one or more personal data. A Supervisory Authority
or more of them can approve or reject zero or more derogations. Similarly, one or more
Supervisory Authorities can monitor and enforce zero or more compliances which are
aggregated by law and privacy requirements.
Zero or more data controllers cooperate with zero or more Supervisory Authorities.
One or more data controllers designates zero or more data protection officers. Recip-
rocally zero or more data protection officers can be designated by one or more data
controllers. Zero or more data controllers inform zero or more data subjects depends on
if there are any data breaches or changes related with data processing. Zero or more data
controllers compensate zero or more data subjects if there are any damage occurs as a
result of an infringement of the GDPR. One or more data controllers/data processors pro-
cess one or more personal data. Similarly, one or more data controllers/data processors
govern and record one or more data processing. One or more data controllers implement
zero or more measures to one or more personal data. Zero or more personal data breaches
impair one or more controllers/data processors. Zero or one data controller carries out
zero or more data protection impact assessments. One or more data controllers should
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demonstrate one or more consents that are given by one or more data subjects for zero or
more processing of their personal data. Finally, one or more data controllers adhere to
zero or more Binding Corporate Rules.
A data subject owns a set of personal data that can be organized by one or more
filing systems. One or more data subjects have one or more rights, which aim to protect
their personal data. One or more data subjects consent to zero or more data processing.
Likewise, zero or more data processing effects one or more data subjects. Zero or one
data subject can lodge a complaint with zero or more Supervisory Authorities. Zero or
more data subjects consent to zero or more derogations. Derogations need to be justified
by a reason, that can display an exceptional case. For example, data concerning health
could be collected by devices without asking any consents, in case of emergency. One
or more health data justify a derogation. Thus, zero or more derogations expedite zero
or more compliance incidents. Eventually, a compliance controls one or more personal
data.
3.4 Summary
The purpose of that chapter was to find answer for those sub-research questions:
SRQ1.4 - What is GDPR? : GDPR is a data protection regime that brought into force
by European Union, in order to simplify lawful processing of personal data, while pro-
hibiting unlawful data processing.
SRQ1.5 - What are GDPR actors? : GDPR actors represent natural persons and legal
entities who have different rights and competences asserted by GDPR. Those actors are:
Data Subject, Data Controller, Data Processor, Data Protection Officer and Supervisory
Authority.
SRQ1.6 - How PETs and PbD strategies can guarantee GDPR compliance? : Arti-
cle 25 in GDPR obliges to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures
by considering the concept of data protection by design. PbD strategies elaborate the
information system by assessing appropriate PET/PETs as technical measures that will
satisfy GDPR requirements of the system by actualizing the concept of data protection
by design.
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4 Secure Tropos Framework
In this chapter, Secure Tropos and its underlying frameworks, which Secure Tropos is
built on top of, are covered. This chapter aims to provide readers with the necessary
background about i* Framework, Tropos methodology and Secure Tropos. Also, we
discuss how Secure Tropos can be extended for privacy and GDPR related concepts. So,
the chapter aims to answer several sub-research question of RQ2. Those questions are :
SRQ2.1 - What is Tropos methodology? SRQ2.2 - Why Tropos methodology is suitable
for acquiring GDPR-compliance?
4.1 Introduction to Secure Tropos
In order to understand Secure Tropos methodology, first we should mention about i*
(iStar) Framework and social modeling. Thereafter, we introduce Tropos methodology
and requirement analysis for composing a comprehensive background.
4.1.1 i* Framework and Social Modeling
i* is a modeling and reasoning framework which is adopted by Tropos [DFH16]. The
framework specifies the types of objects and the relationships between these objects that
can exist in a model which is employing i* [OME00]. Primary aim of i*star to capture
early and late system requests based on the concept of strategic social actors.
i* brings social modeling concept with it and from our point of view that is one of the
features which make PESTOS suitable for designing privacy-sensitive systems. Social
modeling concept carries out a motivation that nowadays our software models should
reflect the social characteristics of complex systems since software systems become ever
more complex and densely intertwined with the human social environment [Yu09]. In
that sense, characterizing and analyzing privacy within a model demands a high social
complexity [LYM03].
The rationale of the i* model can provide answers not only for the what or the how,
but also "the why a piece of software is developed ?" questions as well. As a matter
of fact, it supports a more refined analysis of system dependencies and encourages a
uniform treatment of the system’s functional and non-functional (such as privacy or
security requirements) requirements in that way [BPG+04].
Actors: In i* framework, actors are the central conceptual modeling constructs. They
have strategic goals, beliefs, abilities, and commitments. They are active and intentional
entities that aim at achieving their goals by exercising independent actions based on their
know-how, in collaboration with other actors [DFH16] [Yu09]. Actors are represented
graphically as circles [DFH16].
In i*, we focus on intentional properties and relationships rather than actual behavior.
The analyses requires to ask some questions like [Yu09]: "what does each actor want?",
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"how do they achieve what they want?", "who do they depend on to achieve what they
want?" and "what reconfigurations of those relationships can help actors advance their
strategic interests?"
Intentionality of actors is made explicit through the actor boundary, which is a
graphical container for their intentional elements such as goal, quality, task and resource
together with their inter-relationships. In other saying, elements and relationships will
appear inside this boundary [DFH16].
Figure 4. Actor and Actor Boundary
Intentional Elements: An intentional element which is emerging inside an actor
boundary denotes something that is desired or wanted by that actor. An intentional
element can also appear outside of actor boundaries, as part of a dependency relationship
between two actors [DFH16]. Those intentional elements and their graphical representa-
tion in the model described on below.
• Goal: "a state of affairs that the actor wants to achieve and that has clear-cut criteria
of achievement.", in other words, "an actor’s strategic interests" It is graphically
represented as oval [DFH16].
• Soft Goal: "goals without clear-cut criteria whether they are satisfied or not". Soft-
goals can represent non-functional requirements (such as privacy requirements). It
is graphically represented as cloud or bubbles [Ref11].
• Task: "represents actions that an actor wants to be executed, usually with the
purpose of achieving some goal." It is graphically represented as hexagon [DFH16].
• Resource: "a physical or informational entity that the actor requires in order to
perform a task." It is graphically represented as rectangle [DFH16].
Figure 5. Internal Elements
27
Intentional Links: Intentional links identify different kinds of refinements and
relationships between intentional elements (also called as entities). Moreover, these links
can be connected with external dependencies when the reasoning of the analysis goes
beyond the actor’s boundary [Mou04] [FLM+04].
Figure 6. Intentional Links
• Dependency Links: They identify dependency relationships between different
actors and also between actors and software system by representing those depen-
dencies [Mou04] .
• Means-Ends Links: Means-end analysis is employed to identify goals, soft-goals,
tasks, and/or resources that can provide means for reaching a goal (end) [Mou04].
Thus, each element connected to a goal by a means-ends link is an alternative way
to achieve the goal [FLM+04].
Figure 7. Means-end Analyses
• Decomposition Links: Decomposition links define a refinement for a task or
a goal [FLM+04]. Particularly, AND/OR decomposition provides an AND and
OR decompositions of a root goal/task into sub-goals/tasks [BPG+04]. AND/OR
decomposition allows developers to consider alternatives when decomposing the
goals/tasks of an actor into sub-goals/sub-tasks. Whereas AND decomposition
means all the sub- goals/sub-tasks must be achieved for the root goal/task to
be achieved, OR decomposition means that the achievement of one of the sub-
goals/sub-tasks leads to the achievement of the root goal/task [Mou04].
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Figure 8. OR decomposition (left) - AND decomposition (right)
• Contribution Links: A contribution links describes the impact that an element
has on another. This can be negative (-) or positive (+) [FLM+04]. A positive
contribution link associates two nodes when one node helps in the fulfillment of
the other. A negative contribution link, on the other hand, indicates that a node
contributes towards the denial of another node.
Figure 9. Contribution
Actor Dependencies: Actors depend on each other for goals to be achieved, tasks
to be performed, and resources to be furnished [Yu09]. Those dependencies represent
social relationships for defining the obligations of actors (dependees) to other actors
(dependers) [DFH16] [MGM03]. In order to construct this kind of representation, there
are five notions should be involved into it. They are described via [DFH16] on below :
• Depender: is the actor that depends for something (the dependum) to be provided.
• dependerElmt: is the intentional element within the depender’s actor boundary
where the dependency starts from, which explains why the dependency exists.
• Dependum: is an intentional element that is the object of the dependency.
• Dependee: is the actor that should provide the dependum.
• dependeeElmt: is the intentional element that explains how the dependee intends
to provide the dependum.
Four types of dependencies are distinguished based on the type of dependum, such
as resource dependency, task dependency, goal dependency and softgoal dependency
[Yu09].
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Figure 10. Dependency
4.1.2 Tropos Framework and Requirement Analysis
Tropos is an agent-oriented software development methodology, that embraces the whole
software development process with concepts of the agent paradigm. i* offers a small
set of well-worked out concepts for modeling social setting, however, i* was intended
for early requirements modeling and analysis, so it needed to be revised and extended
to cover the scope of the Tropos methodology [Gio]. Tropos is initiated by Mylopoulos
as a project [BPG+04] and its main function is to adopt the social components of i*
framework from the early requirements level down to the actual implementation. It
is intended for becoming a UML-type language and methodology for agent-oriented
software but better than the UML precedent [Myl]. "Tropos" means a turn, direction or a
way, style, fashion such as "a way of life" in Greek [Hen].
Furthermore, Tropos covers also the very early phases of requirement analysis, thus
allowing for a deeper understanding of the environment where the software must operate
and congeneric interactions that should occur between software and human agents
[BPG+01]. But on top of that, it continues to support and track those requirements until
implementation phase with AOP (Agent Oriented Programming) in mind [BPG+01].
There are five main development phases of the Tropos methedology : Early Require-
ments, Late Requirements, Architectutal Design, Detailed Design and Implementation.
In tropos methodology, notions of i* framework such as agent, goal, task and social
dependency are used to model and analyze early and late software requirements, architec-
tural and detailed design, and eventually to implement the final system. The requirement
analysis in Tropos is divided into 2 different phases: early requirements and late require-
ments. Both share the same conceptual and methodological approach [BPG+04]. On the
other hand, the Architectural Design and the Detailed Design phases focus on the system
specification, according to the requirements resulting from the above phases [BPG+04].
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Figure 11. Comparison of Tropos with other software development methodologies
[BPG+04] [Gio]
• Early requirements
– Environment (the socio and organizational setting) is analyzed. It means
identifying the domain stakeholders and modeling them as social actors
[Gio].
* Which are the main actors?
* What are their goals?
* How can they achieve them ?
* Does an actor depend on another one to achieve its goals?
– We are not interested in describing the system-to-be [Gio].
– We are interested in modeling the analyzed environment in terms of relevant
actors and their respective dependencies [Gio].
• Late requirements
– The system-to-be is introduced as a new actor of the social domain which is
analyzed in the previous phase [Gio].
– This new actor (the system-to-be) is analyzed in terms of Tropos concepts
[Gio].
* goals decomposition
* means-end analysis
* contribution analysis
– Identifying system’s functional and non-functional( e.g: softgoals ) require-
ments after analyze [Gio].
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• Architectural Design
– The actor system-to-be is designed [Gio].
– More system actors (sub-actors) are introduced and are delegated sub-goals
to system-assigned goals [BPG+04].
– Software agents are identified [Gio].
– Agent capabilities are identified [Gio].
• Detailed Design
– Each architectural component is defined in further detail in terms of inputs,
outputs, control, and the security aspects analysed in the previous stages
[MGM03].
– For this stage, Tropos is using elements of UML to complement the features
of i* [MGM03].
Tropos extention of intentional elements : Tropos brings extension to the initial
elements which are introduced in i* section by two additional concepts : capability and
plan.
• Plan: "represents, at an abstract level, a way of doing something. The execution of
plan can be a means for satisfying a goal or for satisfying a soft-goal" [BPG+04].
• Capability: " represents the ability of an actor of defining, choosing and executing
a plan for the fulfillment of a goal, given certain world conditions and in presence
of a specific event" [BPG+04].
Modeling Activities: In order to develop and to refine Tropos models, multifarious
activities, such as actor, dependency, goal, task, and capability modeling, and various
graphical diagrams, such as actor, goal, capability and plan diagrams, are used in the
Tropos methodology [Mou04]. Please refer to Appendix VIII for further information
about those modeling activities.
4.1.3 Secure Tropos
Secure Tropos [MG07] is an approach introduced by Mouratidis et al.and based on
the Tropos methodology, with the scope to define security during system development
[Mat17]. Secure Tropos considers the basic Tropos concepts such as dependency, goal,
task, resource, and capability and adds security concepts such as security constraint,
secure goal, secure plan, secure resource, and secure capability [PIM12]. The major
aspects of the methodology are [Mat17]: (i) social issues of security are analyzed during
the early requirements stage; (ii) security is considered simultaneously with the other
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requirements of the system-to-be; (iii) security is addressed in depth during the system
design phases.
According to Mouratidis, Tropos methodology was partially tackling modeling secure
software systems by allowing developers to use soft-goal concept in order to capture
security requirements together with other non-functional and functional requirements.
However, utilization of the soft-goal concept was not sufficiently address those require-
ments may define constraints on the system that effect its stakeholders [Mou04]. The rea-
son for this is soft-goals mostly represent qualities which are properties or characteristics
of the system that its stakeholders care about, whereas constraints are restrictions, rules
or conditions imposed to the system and unlike qualities are non negotiable [Mou04].
4.2 Secure Tropos for Security & Privacy Modeling
In previous section, we extracted the motivation behind the idea of extending the Tropos
as growing into the Secure Tropos, by cited a several articles. If it has to be mentioned
briefly one more time, we would like to address [IMJ10]: "In order to develop more
secure software systems, security needs to be considered from the early stages of the
development process and software systems developers should analyze not only the system
but also its environment. This is important since all software systems operate within an
environment and the various elements : stakeholders, users, relevant laws and regulations
of the environment might influence the security aspects of the system." Here, a question
should be raised: What about privacy needs and privacy-aware systems?
We believe that the need for developing privacy-aware systems constantly is growing
due to legal regulations go on the stage for advocating human rights and also increasing
privacy threats which become more harmful and frequent by means of misusing fast-
enhancing technology. Thus, privacy needs to be considered also from the early stages of
the development and should be planned according to special privacy design techniques
offered by PbD based on the captured privacy requirements. However, Islam et al. assert
in [IMJ10] that Secure Tropos language does not provide support for modeling legal
dependencies which are needed for eliciting privacy requirements from legal contexts
such as GDPR text.
Moreover, privacy-related concepts and privacy-oriented processes are overlooked by
regarding them as a part of security matters within the Secure Tropos framework. There
is neither any good definition of privacy nor any segregation on modeling entities and
activities, as between privacy-related and secure, offered by the Secure Tropos. In this
section, we exert our effort to cover those entities and activities in order to reveal the
fact we mentioned above and we propose to extend the current Secure Tropos ontology
(naturally it means also extension of the current Tropos ontology) by novel notations and
well-structured methods in order to fill this gap, and thus enable the Tropos methodology
to introduce needs of privacy engineering with social system engineering for focusing
GDPR compliance.
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In order to fulfill this proposal, firstly, we believe that several new concepts which are
shaped by keeping GDPR on the mind; such as privacy constraint, privacy dependency,
privacy mechanism (also known as PET), privacy feature (also known as PbD strategy),
GDPR goal (as protection objectives cover both privacy and security objectives) and
finally privacy reference diagram, must be on-boarded as separate concepts rather than
being considered as a part of security modeling. Secondly, existing concepts of the
Secure Tropos such as actor, goal, task, resource, capability must be utilized according
to definitions and conceptions in the GDPR text.
In this regard, Secure Tropos gives us very convincing reasons for legitimacy of that
prospective preference. Since Mouratidis propounds in [Mou04], the Tropos is a widely
known and published agent oriented software engineering methodology. Therefore,
it is well-supported by many researchers by way of various projects. Moreover, it is
requirements-driven that specifies both the environment of the system and the system
itself, by using the same concepts and notations through the whole development life-
cycle. Finally, it is easily extensible and well integrated with other approaches and
therefore existing work can be considered and incorporated within the proposed approach
[Mou04].
4.2.1 Security-oriented Concepts and Overlooked Privacy in The Secure Tropos
In this section, we are going to present security-oriented concepts and their notations
in the Secure Tropos methodology as described in the thesis of Mouratidis. Also this
section has some examples about how privacy is overlooked under the security-oriented
concepts.
Security Constraint: In [Mou04], Mouratidis takes constraints as a separate concept
of Tropos ontology and propose a more tailored definition for them: "A restriction that
can influence the analysis and design of the multi-agent system under development by
restricting some alternative design solutions, by conflicting with some of the requirements
of the system, or by refining some of the system’s objectives".
A constraint restricts zero or more (0 ... *) dependencies, goals and/or tasks. Con-
versely zero or more (0 ... *) dependencies, goals and/or tasks are restricted by one or
more (1 ... *) constraints. When a constraint is imposed to a goal (or task), two analysis
processes are applied: Constraint decomposition, which aims to further decompose the
constraint into sub-constraints; and goal introduction, which identifies prospective goals
that the constraint might introduce to the system (known as goal introduction)[Mou04].
During the process of goal introduction, the purpose of these goals is to help towards the
achievement of the constraint. In other words, the developer refines the goals of an actor
to allow the satisfaction of a constraint [Mou04].
Mouratidis emphasizes that constraints can be valuable in modeling assorted non-
functional requirements, from this point of view, Mouratidis defines a security constraint.
According to his definition, secure constraint is "a restriction related to security issues,
34
such as privacy, integrity and availability, which can influence the analysis and design of
a multi-agent system under development by restricting some alternative design solutions,
by conflicting with some of the requirements of the system, or by refining some of the
system’s objectives" [Mou04].
It is very noticeable, in that definition above, how privacy overlooked by being
counted as a security issue in Mouratidis paper. However, a highly secure information
system can be non-competent and disregardful in the meaning of personal data privacy.
Imagine a software developed as a customer loyalty program for a chain store which
keep a lot of records of customers like shopping date, shopping time, payment way, name
of brands and categories of goods that customers buy, brunch where shopping activity
actualizes, etc. without taking consent of customers. Even this information system is
equipped with very proactive and cutting edge technologies for security, can we call it
privacy-sensitive?
In order to define GDPR-related restrictions, which may conflict with some system
requirements, we need to have an independent concept of privacy constraint segregated
from the security constraint. Section 5.2 presents the concept of privacy constraint, for
more detailed information please refer to section 5.2.
Secure Dependency: Mouratidis introduces a special class of dependency as secure
dependency. A secure dependency introduces security constraint/constraints that must be
fulfilled for the dependency to be satisfied. Both the depender and the dependee must
agree for the fulfillment of the security constraint in order for the secure dependency
to be valid. That means the depender expects from the dependee to satisfy the security
constraint/constraints and also that the dependee will make an effort to deliver the
dependum by satisfying the security constraint/constraints [Mou04].
Mouratidis classifies secure dependencies under three classes based on who intro-
duces security constraint. Those are distinguished as Dependee Secure Dependency,
Depender Secure Dependency, Double Secure Dependency respectively. In Double
Secure Dependency, security constraints are introduced on both sides [Mou04].
Previously, on the last paragraph of the security constraint headline, we emphasized
that there is a need for introducing a concept of privacy constraint in order to build a
privacy modeling language. From this point of view, we can also talk about a concept of
privacy dependency between the actors. Section 4.2.2 presents the concept of privacy
dependency, for more detailed information please refer to section 4.2.2.
Secure Entities: As we mentioned previously in section 4.1.3, Secure Tropos consid-
ers the Tropos entities and adds them security concepts. In this sense, as Tropos provides
concepts of goal, task, resource, et cetera Secure Tropos provides concepts of secure
goal, secure task, secure resource which are known as secure entities.
A secure goal represents the strategic interests of an actor with respect to security.
Secure goals are mostly introduced in order to achieve potential security constraints,
which are imposed to an actor or exist in the system. Nevertheless, a secure goal does
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not particularly define how the security constraints can be fulfilled, since alternatives
can be considered. On the other hand, a secure task is defined as a task that represents
a particular way for satisfying a secure goal [Mou04]. Eventually, a secure resource
can be defined as an informational entity that is security-critical for the system under
development [Mou04] [Mat17].
With a similar motivation, PESTOS extends the Secure Tropos language by introduc-
ing GDPR entities such as GDPR goal, GDPR task and GDPR resource, while, on the
other hand it involves the secure entities like Assignment, Contribution and adapt some
of them for new privacy entities. Section 5.2 introduces the GDPR entities, for more
detailed information please refer to section 5.2
Secure Capability: In [Mou04], secure capability is described as the ability of an
actor/agent to achieve a secure goal, carry out a secure task and/or deliver a secure
resource.
By PESTOS, instead of capability, GDPR Rights appear as a similar but GDPR
specific concept represent the powers and the legal rights that actors are entitled to
execute under favour of the GDPR.
Secure Reference Diagram: It is a diagram that constructed by actualization of a
modeling activity, which involves the identification of security needs of the system-to-
be and introduces problems, related to the security of the system (such as threats and
vulnerabilities), possible solutions (usually these solutions are identified in terms of a
security policy that the organization might have) to those security problems. Thus, the
security reference diagram represents the relationships between security features, threats,
protection objectives, and security mechanisms [Mou04].
Mouratidis explains the main purpose of the security reference diagram in [Mou04],
according to him, it allows flexibility during the development stages of a multi agent
system and also to save time and effort. He claims that many systems under development
are similar to systems already in existence. Therefore the security reference diagram can
be used as a reference point that can be modified or extended according to specific needs
of particular systems.
Mouratidis prefers to use the same notation of Tropos for elements of the security
reference diagram [Mou04]. Therefore, concepts from the Tropos methodology such
as soft-goals, goals and tasks are used to model security features, protection objectives
and security mechanisms respectively. His motivation behind this decision is allowing
developers to work with well-known concepts and allowing them to use the same concepts
throughout the development process.
With this work, we propose to have a concept of Privacy Reference Diagram, sup-
ported with a similar motivation which Security Reference Diagram has, since GDPR
compliance requires to identify both security and privacy needs of the system-to-be.
However, in contrast to preference of Mouratidis, we submit new notations for some
elements of Privacy Reference Diagram, which are Privacy Features, Privacy Constraint
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and Privacy Mechanism. In order to make software engineers to concentrate better on
privacy-oriented problem analyzing and aware about independent concepts of privacy,
that are different than the concepts of security, we offer to follow that approach since
Tropos methodology is highly applicable to extend its notations together its application
area.
• Security Features: (also protection properties) As Mouratidis identifies, "it repre-
sent features associated to security that the system-to-be must have". In Mouratidis’
work the concept of a soft-goal is used to capture security features on the security
reference diagram. He take this decision because the concept of soft-goal is used,
in the Tropos methodology, to model quality attributes for which there are no a pri-
ori, clear criteria for satisfaction but are judged by actors as being sufficiently met.
He claims that similarly, security features are not subject to any clear criteria for
satisfaction. "Examples of security features are privacy, availability, and integrity"
[Mou04].
Here by that definition, we can clearly re-comprehend that privacy was counted
as a security feature by Mouratidis. Within PESTOS system-to-be (a GDPR
compliant system) has clear, well-distinguished privacy features like anonymity,
pseudonymity, unlinkability, et cetera.
• Protection Objectives: They represent a set of principles or rules that contribute
towards the achievement of the security features. These principles identify possible
solutions to the security problems and usually they can be found in the form of the
security policy of the organization [Mou04].
In PESTOS point of view, if there is a need to define "privacy objectives", that
need is supposed to be fulfilled by seven principles of PbD.
• Security Mechanism: It represent standard security methods for helping towards
the satisfaction of the protection objectives. Mouratidis claims that some of these
methods are able to prevent security attacks, whereas others are able merely
to pinpoint security breaches. The concept of a task is used to model security
mechanisms in Mouratidis’ work. As he clarifies, this decision took place, because
in Tropos, a task represents a particular way of doing something, such as the
satisfaction of a goal. In the same sense, a security mechanism represents a
particular way of satisfying a protection objective [Mou04].
• Threats: They represent circumstances that have the potential to cause loss; or
problems that can put in danger the security features of the system. Mouratidis
introduced a new notation within Secure Tropos since Tropos doesn’t provide any
related concept to model threats [Mou04].
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Figure 12. Notations of elements of Security Referance Diagram [Mou04]
4.2.2 Privacy-oriented Extension of Secure Tropos Framework
This thesis presents a language to extend Secure Tropos framework in order to support
the consideration of GDPR during the development of privacy-sensitive, compliant
software systems. In particular, the PESTOS framework enables software developers (i)
to correctly elicit privacy requirements from the GDPR. (ii) to trace these requirements
during the development stages in order to ensure design phase supports to build compliant
systems that can demonstrate GDPR accountability. (iii) to consider privacy and security
simultaneously with the other requirements of the system-to-be.
Existing notations of Secure Tropos does not completely support privacy components
and it is not capable to represent GDPR-related concepts. PESTOS extends Tropos
methodology in order to : 1)Introduce new privacy-related concepts and GDPR-related
concepts 2)Introduce GDPR-oriented processes, Privacy-oriented processes and the
integration of this process into the development stages of the Tropos methodology.
4.3 Summary
The purpose of that chapter was to find answer for those sub-research questions:
SRQ2.1 - What is Tropos methodology? : Tropos is an agent-oriented software
development methodology which is built on top of i* framework.
SRQ2.2 - Why Tropos methodology is suitable for acquiring GDPR-compliance? :
Tropos covers the very early phases of requirement analysis, thus allowing for a deeper
understanding of the environment where the software must operate and congeneric
interactions that should occur between software and human agents. But on top of
that, it continues to support and track those requirements until implementation phase.
Additionally, Tropos methodology is well supported by available materials and tools. It
is also easily extensible for analyzing specific requirements of the system, which in our
case GDPR requirements.
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5 Privacy Enhanced Secure Tropos
This chapter will be focusing on explaining GDPR compliance approach of PESTOS
through privacy modeling and also the language itself by covering its abstract syntax
(meta-model), semantics and concrete syntax. It will also illustrate how PESTOS extends
Tropos methodology for building the GDPR compliant software systems.
5.1 Meta-model
Meta-model is used here as a means to define syntax and semantics of PESTOS formally
in order to analyze software models that are created by using the language.
Figure 13. PESTOS meta-model
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According to meta-model, one actor has zero or more constraints which some of them
could be privacy constraints. Zero or more of those privacy constraints restricts zero or
more privacy dependencies between different actors. One actor has zero or more strategic
goals which can be restricted zero or more constraints. One goal may be accompanied
by zero or more assignments.
An actor also has zero or more tasks which contributes different goals. One goal can
be supported by zero or more contributions which might come from a task or another
goal. One or more negative contributions might come from an infringement. One or more
infringements can be originated by a honest-but-curious adversary. Honest-but-curious
adversary (HBC) here represents an actor who doesn’t intent to prepare an attack against
to a filing system but can misuse to any flaws that an actor includes or/and a task includes
in order to reveal personal data of individuals due to curiosity. One HBC initiates one or
more infringements which disclose one or more system resources.
An actor has zero or more capabilities for executing zero or more tasks and delivering
zero or more resources. A capability can contribute to zero or more resources and goals
of both the actor who has that capability itself and the other actors. A capability also can
contribute to a task. One actor can use zero or more resources. An actor embodies zero
or more flaws that allows HBC to interact with it.
5.2 Semantics and Concrete Syntax
The entities of the Tropos methodology need to be extended with GDPR compliance and
data privacy in mind. Therefore, the following figures (Fig. 14 and Fig. 18) show how
concepts from the GDPR compliance meta-model can be combined by concepts from
the PESTOS meta-model in order to introduce GDPR constructs.
Privacy Constraint: Privacy constraint is a restriction related to privacy issues that
can interfere with design of the multi-agent system under development by restricting
some alternative design solutions, by conflicting with some of the requirements of the
system which are not eligible according to PbD concept and may refine some objectives
of the system. As we mentioned before in section 4.2.1, a constraint restricts zero or
more dependencies, goals and/or tasks. Hereby, it is important to recall Privacy by
Design strategies of Hoepman that we introduced in section 2.2.2. In his paper [Hoe14]
Hoepman states that design strategies do not necessarily impose a specific structure on
the system but they certainly limit the possible structural realizations of it. It shows how
to utilize PbD strategies and PbD patterns in order to describe privacy features that will
clarify privacy constraints.
Privacy Dependency: A type of dependency that introduces privacy constraint/-
constraints that must be fulfilled for the dependency to be satisfied. Both the depender
and the dependee must agree for the fulfillment of the privacy constraint in order for
the privacy dependency to be legit. Accordingly, the depender anticipates from the
dependee to satisfy the privacy constraint/constraints and meanwhile the dependee will
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make an effort to deliver the dependum by satisfying the privacy constraint/constraints.
A dependum may get a contribution by a privacy feature in the case of satisfying the
privacy constraint/constraints.
Figure 14. GDPR-related concepts I
We can set out three different privacy dependencies based on who introduces the
privacy constraint. They will be listed as Dependee Privacy Dependency, Depender
Privacy Dependency, Double Privacy Dependency and will be displayed respectively on
below.
Figure 15. Dependee Privacy Dependency
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Figure 16. Depender Privacy Dependency
Figure 17. Double Privacy Dependency
GDPR Actor: It represents either a natural or legal person who is subject of the
GDPR and that’s why has certain goals and abilities in respect to GDPR. GDPR actors
are represented in section 3.2, please refer it if you need more information.
GDPR Resource: An informational entity that is security-critical and privacy-critical
for the system aiming to be GDPR compliant, for example : personal data. The GDPR
resource is graphically represented as a Resource, but it is denoted with a (P) label
additionally.
GDPR Goal: represents the strategic interests of a GDPR actor with respect to legal
compliance and data protection. GDPR goals are derived from Rights of the Data Subject
within the GDPR. In this sense, we can talk about a kind of bilateral relationship between
the data subject and the other GDPR actors in order to succeed a mutual achievement
based on the Rights of the Data Subject. Just to clarify, subject should be able to execute
the rights in any time and the other GDPR actors should make that certain.
GDPR goals are well-defined and well-circumscribed since they are derived from
the Rights of the Data Subject within the GDPR text. In this context, GDPR goals are
introduced as hard goals according to Tropos methodology by PESTOS. They are mostly
introduced in order to accomplish potential privacy constraints which are imposed to
a GDPR actor or already exist in the system. Although privacy constraints restrict
GDPR goals, a GDPR goal does not particularly define how the privacy constraint can
be achieved.
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Figure 18. GDPR-related concepts II
The following table (Tabl. 1) displays GDPR goals with related GDPR articles that
explains what they are all about and which GDPR tasks that users shall perform in order
to reach those goals.
GDPR Task: GDPR task represents actions that a GDPR actor wants to perform in
order to satisfy its GDPR goals. The GDPR task is adapted from task concept of Tropos
methodology. Its graphical representation is similar with the graphical representation of
Task.
GDPR Capability: GDPR capability represents legal powers, responsibilities and
abilities of a GDPR actor to fulfill its GDPR goals. Those legal powers, responsibilities
and abilities are defined under article 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 28, 35, 37, 38, 39,
57, 60, 77 in the GDPR. In PESTOS you can refer section 3.2 in order to have a listed
version of them per GDPR actor.
For example, a supervisory authority has a legal power for enforcing the GDPR. It is
represented as a GDPR capability of the GDPR actor, which is Supervisory Authority
here, and its graphical representation is similar with the one for Capability from Tropos
except it has a (P) label additionally.
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Table 1. GDPR Goals Associated GDPR Articles
GDPR Goals GDPR Articles
Security (Confidentiality, Availability, Integrity) 24, 25, 32
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
Organizational & Legal goals 24, 25, 27, 28, 29
(Lawfulness, Privacy Risk Assessment, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38
Privacy Policy, Privacy Management Trainings) 39, 40, 41, 42, 43
44, 45, 46, 47, 48
49
Right of access 15, 24, 25
Right to rectification 16, 24, 25
Right to data portability 20, 24, 25
Right to erasure 17, 24, 25
Right to restriction of processing 9, 10, 18, 21, 22
(including Right to object) 24, 25
Data Minimization 89
Transparency 12, 13, 14, 19, 24
25, 30, 33, 34, 49
Privacy Reference Diagram: It is a diagram that built by actualization of a modeling
activity involves the identification of privacy needs of the system-to-be (GDPR compliant
system) by introducing GDPR irregularities of the system (privacy related problems,
regulatory problems) and possible technical privacy measures that are applicable to those
irregularities. Thus, the privacy reference diagram represents the relationship between
privacy features, flaws, infringements and privacy mechanisms.
The infringement meta-model (Fig. 19) shows how situating an event that may cause
infringement could take place within privacy reference model of PESTOS. Infringement
occurs whenever a HBC(Honest-but-curious adversary) finds out a flaw in the information
system which processes personal data or in a task which is supposed to executed in order
to reach a strategic goal. On the other hand, infringement may emerge also exclusively
due to unlawful data processing.
Flaw: Flaw represents a condition, a behavior, a mechanism or a design decision
which brings imperfection to an actor or a task. Such imperfections may potentiality
cause infringements in respect of the GDPR.
Infringement: Infringement describes a situation where a potential data breach
or an inconsistency in respect to GDPR may be occurred where an HBC as an agent
takes action. An infringement can be modeled in two different way: 1. as a means-end
relationship between a capability, which an HBC has, and GDPR resource 2. as an
independent concrete syntax (which looks like a paraboloid figure), in cases where an
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unlawful processing takes place. The both representations can be seen on the below in
Figure 20.
Figure 19. Infringement Meta-model
Figure 20. Graphical representations of infringement
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Privacy Features: Privacy Features represent PbD strategies (e.g minimize, aggre-
gate) and characteristics associated to privacy patterns(e.g anonymity, pseudonymity),
such as the most appropriate ones between them (here, we mean picking appropriate
ones from data oriented strategies, all process oriented strategies should be take place for
each systems) for satisfying privacy requirements of the system should be considered
through the development life cycle of the system-to-be from the beginning of the design
phase. The following figure shows how those strategies can be imposed by different
GDPR actors of the system .
Figure 21. PbD strategies by GDPR actors, adapted from [CHH16]
Privacy Objectives: Privacy Objectives represent PbD principles that Privacy Fea-
tures take inspiration from. It is an abstract concept so PESTOS doesn’t introduce any
notation for a privacy objective. PbD principles are mentioned in section 2.2
Privacy Mechanism: It represents Privacy Enhancing Technologies(PETs) to con-
tribute actualizing GDPR tasks that are supposed to satisfy GDPR goals, eventually.
Privacy Mechanism should enable the application of system’s Privacy Features that
satisfy privacy objectives.
5.3 Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce extended Tropos methodology for building
the GDPR-complaint software systems. PESTOS model aims to offer compliance
solutions with the scope to address privacy and GDPR during system development. To
fulfil this aim, this chapter introduced concrete syntax for GDPR concepts and explained
the semantics of the language.
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6 Example of PESTOS Model
This chapter introduces an application of PESTOS methodology based on a real-world
case. It aims to introduce also application method of PESTOS in general. Finally, the
chapter aims to to evaluate the proposed privacy-oriented & GDPR-oriented approach
and better understand its advantages.
6.1 Case Presentation
In order to apply PESTOS and analyze the models, that are obtained after the imple-
mentation, an Identity and Access Management (IAM) platform of an organization is
decided as a case study. Due to organizational secrecy, we prefer to not mention here
the names of the organization and the platform. The vision of IAM is to enable effective
administration of identities and access rights in the organization. In this public version
of the thesis, there is no any further information about IAM platform.
6.2 Application Method
Figure 22. 3 Phases 4 Steps, adapted from [ISM+13]
The approach for modeling application of PESTOS within one iteration requires to
follow 3 steps :
1. Embodiment
2. Finding Irregularities
3. Compliance Check
based on building two types of model :
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1. Privacy Reference Model
2. GDPR Compliance Model
After compliance check took place the model is going to be revised by engineers, if
they think there are still unsatisfied requirements with potential unsolved irregularities.
Thus, revision phase may appear based on a decision. The revision phase brings one
more step and an iteration of first two phases :
4. Resolving Irregularities
Revision phase can be repeated over and over in order to re-mediate the compliance
model. In our implementation case, we won’t go to that much details rather only first
two phases, analyses and check, will be covered.
Embodiment: Modeling the GDPR requirements of the system and system actors
by using the concrete syntax of PESTOS within GDPR compliance model. Modeling
privacy threats and privacy requirements of that system within privacy reference model.
Finding Irregularities: Finding irregularities of the system as-is with respect to
GDPR and PbD strategies based on privacy reference model.
Compliance Check: The important goal of this step is to evaluate whether the given
GDPR compliance model satisfies the compliance properties. This step takes as input
the privacy reference model of requirements where all the irregularities and possible
measures have been highlighted.
Resolving Irregularities: Addressing all irregularities identified in the model in
order to revise it by engineers proposing new elements, new operationalizations and
changes. A discussion will evaluate whether the changes made are sufficient to consider
the irregularity solved. The model is revised until the discussion rejects the validity of
the irregularity. At the end of this step, each irregularity has been considered and then
resolved through revisions of the model.
6.3 Privacy Reference Model
By privacy reference model, we constructed an infringement scenario which displays
HBCs and their capabilities which might be used in order to disclose sensitive personal
data.
In privacy reference model, we can also introduce privacy constraints, privacy features
and privacy mechanisms in order to design a system which has preventive measures in
order to prevent potential infringements, that may caused by different internal actors.
Some privacy constraints should be considered whenever actors want to reach their
essential goals. This public version of the thesis doesn’t include any further information
about Privacy Reference Model.
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6.4 GDPR Compliance Model
GDPR compliance model is introduced with a goal modeling diagram. In the diagram,
different GDPR actors realizes their goals and executes their tasks by as much as their
capabilities allow them in order to perform a Data Subject’s Right. So this diagram is a
part of the GDPR compliance model. This public version of the thesis doesn’t include
any further information about GDPR Compliance Model.
6.5 Validation of PESTOS Model
As mentioned before in the Secure Tropos Framework chapter, this study aims to extend
and customize an agent oriented software engineering methodology to enable it to model
privacy and compliance issues within the scope of the GDPR, rather than building one
from scratch.
By validation of this work, we mean validation of usability and correctness of the
models introduced in this chapter. For this purpose we prepare a validation strategy that
aims to collect unbiased feedbacks from identity and security experts in the organization.
The feedbacks were collected after the presentation of the PESTOS framework, the case
study and the PESTOS models. The validation strategy is defined and conducted of
survey questionnaire and interview, based on open-ended questions. Due to the hardship
in finding a large number of qualified people, who can evaluate such a specific work, our
sample size is limited with 21 people.
Figure 23. Results of the PESTOS Evaluation Survey
Within survey, those questions shown in Figure 23 were asked to be marked anony-
mously between 1 to 10. We use semantic differential scale as the response scale of the
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PESTOS evaluation survey. In Figure 23 mean(average score), median(middle score)
and variance for each question are written on the right side of the table. According to this
result, after a careful evaluation of PESTOS model by identity & security experts, who
allege, that they have a solid knowledge about GDPR and privacy concept, it may safely
be said that PESTOS is a modeling language which has a moderately easy syntax and
flexibility, whereas it is fairly efficient to model GDPR compliant systems. It is fairly
extensible as a privacy modeling language and considered as it may have neglectable
shortages or some edge cases, due to being a new modeling language.
6.6 Summary
The main aim of this chapter was to illustrate how the proposed modeling language
can be applied in the redesign of a real life information system. To fulfill this aim, this
chapter described how the extended and customized Tropos methodology was employed
for Identity and Access Management (IAM) platform of an financial institution in order
to identify GDPR and privacy requirements of the system. In addition, this chapter
described the validation approach for the proposed modeling language and evaluation
feedbacks from identity & security experts.
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7 Conclusion
This thesis gives an outline of privacy and privacy components by touching on privacy
by design strategies and privacy enhancing technologies. The study commentates GDPR
and approaches GDPR compliance as a modeling activity that could be realized by
identifying system requirements related with privacy and GDPR in an early phase of
design stage. In this direction, the study covers Secure Tropos methodology and enhance
it by introducing GDPR and privacy concepts with new concrete syntax for each element.
In order to explain Secure Tropos methodology, the thesis briefly touches on i* framework
and Tropos methodology, beforehand. Moreover, the study introduces a new modeling
language, PESTOS, with its meta-model, semantics and concrete syntax. Finally, it
displays an application of the PESTOS modeling language in a real-world system and
validation of the framework based on evaluation of the real-world case by identity &
security experts.
7.1 Limitations
There are certain limitations about this dissertation that could be mentioned here. First
of all, there is a paucity of literature about requirement engineering which addressing
legal regulations so far and this case becomes more obvious if we talk especially about
the limited literature on GDPR from requirement analysis and modeling perspective.
By its nature a model has a certain level of abstraction which reflects the understand-
ing of the modeler about system requirements. By PESTOS, we enable modelers to
introduce technical measures, by "Privacy Feature" and "Privacy Mechanism" concepts,
against to potential infringements. However, compliance with GDPR doesn’t stand on
only technical measures but also organizational measures. Organizational measures
aren’t taken into the scope of this work due to there could be belong to various categories
and the fact that how they should be implemented may differ by the organizational culture
and the structure of an organization.
Additionally, another limitation may emerges by employing PETs as technical mea-
sures. As we mentioned before in the second chapter, PETs are not widely adopted yet
due to three different obstacles; lack of availability of PETs, lack of user friendliness,
subsistence of drawbacks in infrastructure deployment.
7.2 Answers to Research Questiones
In the introduction chapter we state our main research question “How to extend Tropos
methodology for building the GDPR compliant software systems ?”. We disintegrate this
question into three minor research questions.
RQ1 - How to make software systems GDPR-compliant? : GDPR obliges to imple-
ment appropriate technical and organizational measures via considering the concept of
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data protection by design. Thus, PESTOS aims to help system designers and develop-
ers in order to plan, implement, maintain and demonstrate GDPR compliance through
ensuring compliant processing of personal data by pointing proper PETs. As well as it
proposes to assign PETs to GDPR resources according to PbD strategies which reflects
the concept of data protection by design.
RQ2 - How can Tropos methodology implement GDPR-compliance principles? :
Tropos methodology provides enough extensibility to represent GDPR-related concepts
by introducing new modeling constructs such as Privacy Mechanism, Privacy Feature,
GDPR Resource, GDPR Actor, GDPR Goal and Infringement. Through those enti-
ties Tropos methodology is used to build a number of models within goal and actor
orientation.
RQ3 - How to apply enhanced Tropos methodology to the GDPR compliance? :
Application method consists of three phases and four steps as illustrated in Section 6.2.
Those steps are Embodiment, Finding Irregularities, Compliance Check and Resolving
Irregularities. PESTOS model can be improved with additional iterations of the ap-
plication method until the complaint version of requirements are considered as fully
satisfied.
7.3 Conclusion
We proposed PESTOS as a main contribution, a privacy modeling language for GDPR
compliance. To the best of our knowledge, PESTOS is the first framework, enhanced
based on Secure Tropos methodology in order to elicit GDPR requirements by various
methods.
Since all new methods require a form of validation, our second contribution consists
of the through evaluation of the PESTOS methodology, in terms of correctness and
usability, based on its applications.
7.4 Future Work
Privacy modeling is still considered as a novel area and similar studies on the GDPR
haven’t reached a meaningful amount of numbers yet. So this study is a pioneer in that
field and it’s our very firmly belief that it would create a basis for following works.
Once, the number of similar studies hit a sufficient level of existing works then
different validations methods that may perform to measure performance of the PESTOS
by comparing with the other studies who focus on the requirement engineering for the
GDPR compliance. For now, it is left for the future due to lack of time and resource.
Also a modeling tool could be developed for PESTOS framework which may increase
the ease of application of PESTOS. Thus, it would facilitate the workload of system
engineers caused by modeling with PESTOS.
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Appendix
I. List of Abbreviations
AD Active Directory
AOP Agent Oriented Programming
BCR Binding Corporate Rules
BEH Behörighet för Sparbankerna (Authority for Savings Banks)
CVF Core Value Framework
DPO Data Protection Officer
FIP Fair Information Practices
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
GUID Globally Unique Identifier
HBC Honest-but-curious Adversary
HR Human Resources
IAM Identity and Access Management
ICT Information and Communication Technologies
ICO Information Commissioner’s Office
PbD Privacy by Design
PbRD Privacy by ReDesign
PESTOS Privacy Enhanced Secure Tropos
PETs Privacy Enhancing Technologies
PIA Privacy Impact Analysis
pID Personal Identification
QM Queue Manager
SD Strategic Dependency
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SR Strategic Rationale
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
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II. Privacy as a Human Right
Accompanied by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which is adopted
by United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 10 December 1948 at the Palais de
Chaillot in Paris, France, privacy gained important ground for itself in that international
document that states basic rights and fundamental freedoms to which all human beings
are entitled. Here, It has to be admitted that UDHR is not legally binding, however, it has
a profound influence on enacting international laws for human rights by being widely
accepted by almost all members of the international community [Aus].
In the Declaration, article 12 reflects that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his
honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks." [UDH48] and privacy, in turn, it has been a plank of UDHR and
has been enshrined as a fundamental right since the very beginning of general assembly
herewith.
Furthermore, in the course of time UNGA became more concerned about privacy
because of the new technologies which are very popular, however, at the same time also
vulnerable to electronic surveillance and interception. Ultimately, in December 2013,
UNGA adopted resolution 68/167, which expressed deep concern at the negative impact
that surveillance and interception of communications may have on human rights. UNGA
affirmed that the rights held by people off-line must also be preserved online, and it called
upon all countries to respect and protect the right to privacy in digital communication
[Uni14].
The General Assembly called on all States to respect and protect the right to privacy,
including in the context of digital communication and to review their procedures, prac-
tices and legislation related to communications surveillance, interception and collection
of personal data and emphasized the need for States to ensure the full and effective
implementation of their obligations under international human rights law. UNGA also
encourages them to to take measures to put an end to violations of those rights and
to create the conditions to prevent such violations, including by ensuring that relevant
national legislation complies with their obligations under international human rights law
[Uni14].
Lastly, UDHR is not the only international document which affirms the privacy as a
fundamental human right. Similarly, The Council of Europe (CoE) declares a right to
respect for one’s private and family life, his home and his correspondence by Article 8
in European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union defines the same values and very alike principles by Article 7 and
Article 8 [DDH+15].
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III. Seven Principles of Privacy by Design
1. Proactive & Preventative : "The Privacy by Design approach is characterized by
proactive rather than reactive measures. It anticipates and prevents privacy invasive
events before they happen. PbD does not wait for privacy risks to materialize, nor
does it offer remedies for resolving privacy infractions once they have occurred
− it aims to prevent them from occurring. In short, Privacy by Design comes
before-the-fact, not after." [Cav11]
2. Privacy as the Default Setting : "We can all be certain of one thing − the default
rules! Privacy by Design seeks to deliver the maximum degree of privacy by
ensuring that personal data are automatically protected in any given IT system or
business practice. If an individual does nothing, their privacy still remains intact.
No action is required on the part of the individual to protect their privacy − it is
built into the system, by default." [Cav11]
3. Privacy Embedded into Design : "Privacy by Design is embedded into the design
and architecture of IT systems and business practices. It is not bolted on as an
add-on, after the fact. The result is that privacy becomes an essential component
of the core functionality being delivered. Privacy is integral to the system, without
diminishing functionality." [Cav11]
4. Full Functionality : "Privacy by Design seeks to accommodate all legitimate
interests and objectives in a positive-sum “win-win” manner, not through a dated,
zero-sum approach, where unnecessary trade-offs are made. Privacy by Design
avoids the pretence of false dichotomies, such as privacy vs. security, demonstrat-
ing that it is possible, and far more desirable, to have both." [Cav11]
5. End-to-End Security : "Privacy by Design, having been embedded into the
system prior to the first element of information being collected, extends securely
throughout the entire life-cycle of the data involved — strong security measures
are essential to privacy, from start to finish. This ensures that all data are securely
retained, and then securely destroyed at the end of the process, in a timely fashion.
Thus, Privacy by Design ensures cradle to grave, secure life-cycle management of
information, end-to-end." [Cav11]
6. Visibility & Transparency : "Privacy by Design seeks to assure all stakeholders
that whatever the business practice or technology involved, it is in fact, operating
according to the stated promises and objectives, subject to independent verification.
Its component parts and operations remain visible and transparent, to both users
and providers alike. Remember, trust but verify!" [Cav11]
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7. User-Centric : "Above all, Privacy by Design requires architects and operators to
keep the interests of the individual uppermost by offering such measures as strong
privacy defaults, appropriate notice, and empowering user-friendly options. Keep
it user-centric!" [Cav11]
The 7 foundational principles of PbD have been already translated into 23 different
languages. In this way, by this potential to reach global consent, PbD unites the
essential components for effective data protection across boarders and in world
society [Cav11].
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IV. Privacy by ReDesign
In May 2011, Privacy by Design was extended into Privacy by ReDesign (PbRD) to
provide a framework for enhancing privacy safeguards in existing and legacy systems,
where the chance of embedded design by default had already passed. PbRD is introduced
by [CP11]. It is claimed as a transformative process which targets to legacy systems
for privacy remediation within 3 phases. These three phases are also called as 3 R’s of
PbRD: Rethink, Redesign and Revive in respectively [CP11].
Figure 24. Diagram : Implementing Privacy by Design [CP11]
Figure 2 on the above displays the phases with their objectives, key activities and
anticipated outcomes. According to the diagram, it is aimed to identify the business
and privacy requirements that are related with the target system in the rethink phase.
Framework achieves this objective by evaluating existing privacy controls and identifying
deficiencies based on PbD principles (gap analyses). Finally this will help to define the
strategic business objectives and to develop an initial implementation strategy. By the
end of this phase, enhancing clear project objectives is the anticipated outcome [CP11].
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In the redesign phase, the main objective is to design, build and test new controls that
will be compliance in/with both the business and privacy requirements which identified
in the rethink phase. In that way, eliminating non compliant controls and implementing
the new controls for testing become the key activities of redesign phase. Redesigned
target system is the anticipated outcome [CP11].
Finally, in the revive phase, the main objective is the integration of the redesigned
system into the organization. Revalidation of the redesigned system by considering PbD
principles, deployment of the redesigned system and its integration with other systems in
the organization are key activities through the phase. At the end, anticipated output is
having a fully-functional integrated, privacy-enhanced system [CP11].
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V. Classification of the PETs by Pullonen et all.
Figure 25. Table : Classification of privacy enhancing technologies [PMB17]
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VI. Association of PETs with PbD Strategies
Table 2. Association of PETs (Privacy Mechanisms) with PbD Strategies (Privacy Fea-
tures) (H.ul - Hide / unlinkability, H.ud - Hide / undetectability, H.e - Hide / encryption,
M - Minimize, A - Abstract, P - Plausible deniability, C - Control, I - Inform), Adapted
from [Wuy15]
Category Privacy Mechanisms: PETs H.ul H.ud H.e M A P C I
Anonymity system Mix-networks (1981) [Cha81] X X X
DC-networks (1985) [Cha85, Cha88] X X X
ISDN-mixes [PPW91] X X X
Onion Routing (1996) [SGR] X X X
Crowds (1998) [RR98] X X X
Single proxy (90s) (Anonymizer, SafeWeb) X X X
Anonymous Remailer(Mixminion Type 3 (2003) [oIa]) X X X
Low-latency communication (Freedom Network [BGS01], X X X
Java Anon Proxy (2000) [BFK01], Tor (2004) [DMS04])
Invisible Internet Project (I2P [TCF12]) X X X
DC-net & MIX-net + dummy traffic, ISDN-mixes [PPW91] X X X X
Broadcast systems [PW, WP] + dummy traffic X X X
Privacy preserving Private authentication [AF04, ABB+04] + dummy traffic X X
authentication Anonymous credentials X X
( single show [BC], multi show [CL04] )
Deniable authentication [Nao02] X X X
Off-the-record messaging [BGB04] X X X X
Privacy preserving Multi-party computation (Secure function evaluation) X X
cryptographic [Yao82, NN01]
protocols Anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol [RDB+10] X X X
Information retrieval Private information retrieval [CKGS98] + dummy traffic X X X
Oblivious transfer [Rab81, Cac98] X X X
Privacy preserving data mining [VBF+04, Pin02] X X X
Searchable encryption [ABC+07], Private search [OS07] X X
Data anonymization K-anonymity model [Swe02b, Swe02a], L-diversity X X X
[MGKV06], T-closeness [LLV07] X X X
Information hiding Steganography [AP98] X X X
Covert communication [MCNM03] X X X
Spread spectrum [KM01] X X X
Pseudonymity systems Privacy enhancing identity management system [HBC+04] X X
User-controlled identity management system [CPHH02] X X
Privacy preserving biometrics [STP09] X X
Encryption techniques Symmetric key & public key encryption [MCV01] X
Deniable encryption [DCIO16] X X
Homomorphic encryption [FG07] X
Verifiable encryption [CD98] X
Access control Context-based access control [GMPT01] X
techniques Privacy-aware access control [CF08, ACK+10] X
Policy and feedback Policy communication (P3P [OAL12]) X
tools Policy enforcement (XACML [oas17], EPAL [And06]) X
Feedback tools for user privacy awareness X
[LHDL04, PK09, LBW08]
Data removal tools (spyware removal, browser cleaning X
tools, activity traces eraser, harddisk data eraser)
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VII. I˙* Model Views
A model that is developed within i* framework can be visualized into multiple views.
Three most common views that are originated from the original i* proposal and some
extensions : the Strategic Rationale (SR) view, the Strategic Dependency (SD) view, and
the Hybrid view [DFH16]. In i*, each operational configuration is typically expressed
through an SD model. The alternatives that are explored in an SR model refer to the
alternative SD configurations that have different implications for the various strategic
interests held by each actor [Yu09].
• Strategic Dependency (SD): The SD view shows each actor in the model, the
actor association links, and the dependency relationships among various actors in
an organizational context. The SD model is a higher level abstraction than typical
process models such as data-flow diagrams, activity diagrams...etc. [DFH16]
[Yu09].
• Strategic Rationale (SR): Goals, tasks, resources and softgoals are attributed to
each actor in SR view, this time as internal intentional elements that the actor wants
to achieve. The link is used to connect a task to a goal is called as a means-end
link, indicating a specific way to achieve the goal. Typically there is more than
one way to achieve a goal, so a goal in an SR model prompts the question – how
else can this goal be achieved ? [Yu09]
• Hybrid SD/SR: "It is often useful to combine SD/SR views where some of the
actors are open, but not all, focusing on the strategic rationale of a particular set of
actors, and the actor links are hidden." [Yu09]
72
VIII. Tropos Modeling Activities
• Actor Modeling: It consists of identifying and analyzing different stakeholders
of the system as social actors together with their intentions on specific goals. In
particularly, during the late requirement phase, actor modeling focuses on the
definition of the actor system-to-be [BPG+04].
• Dependency Modeling: It involves the identification of the dependencies between
the different actors which depend on one another for goals to be achieved, plans to
be performed, and resources to be furnished. Dependency modeling takes place
through the first three Tropos development phases. During the early requirements
analysis stage, dependency modeling is focused on identifying dependencies
between the actors of the organization setting in which the system will operate.
In late requirements analysis stage, the dependencies between the system and the
actors of its organization setting are identified and some of the actors dependencies
identified in the previous stage are refined due to the system introduction. During
the architectural design the data and control flows between the different actors of
the system are modeled in terms of dependencies providing the basis for mapping
the system’s actors to software agents [BPG+04] [Mou04].
• Goal Modeling: The internal goals of each actor identified through actor modeling
are furthered analyzed by goal modeling for providing a more precise definition
of the actor. It involves three basic reasoning techniques: means-end analysis,
contribution analysis, and AND/OR decomposition. During the early requirements
analysis, goal modeling helps to refine the initially identified actors by further
analyzing their goals and identify new dependencies, or refine existing ones,
whereas during the late requirements analysis, goal modeling helps to further
analyze the goals of the system. Finally, in the architectural design phase, goal
modeling motivates the first-decomposition of the system actors into a set of
sub-actors [BPG+04] [Mou04].
• Plan Modeling: It can be considered complimentary to the goal modeling activity
and it employs similar reasoning techniques [BPG+04].
• Capability Modeling: It starts at the end of the architectural design and it involves
the identification of capabilities for of the actors of the system according to the
goals, tasks and dependencies of each actor. "Individual" capabilities are assigned
to the actors of the system to make them to define, choose and execute tasks for
achieving their goals together with "social" capabilities that let actors to manage
dependencies with the other actors [BPG+04] [Mou04].
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